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I would like to thank the commentators for taking the time to read and respond to my target
article (Peña-Guzmán 2017) and for articulating important critiques of my position on
animal suicide. Some of these made me rethink some of the claims I made in the article 1;
others afforded me the opportunity to further clarify and defend my argument; 2 and others
pushed me to confront issues I had not yet considered but now view as germane to the
subject.3 Here, I respond to these critiques and defend my original claim that “there are sound
empirical and philosophical reasons to support the animal suicide hypothesis” (p. 18).
In section 1 (What Is Suicide?), I talk about definitions. How should we define suicide?
Much hangs on this deceptively simple question since the definition we choose will determine
whether animals can fall under its scope. In section 2 (What Makes Us So Special (and
Suicidal)?), I discuss three capacities that some commentators believe are exclusively human
and justify an anthropocentric theory of suicide: intent, judgment, and theory of mind (ToM).
In section 3 (The Evolution of Suicide), I discuss the evolution of suicide. While I do not take a
definitive stance, I catalogue some of the views presented and respond to those that employ
evolutionary arguments of various sorts to support the anthropocentric position. Then, in
section 4 (Areas for Further Research), I discuss four areas where further research may help:
(i) empirical work on the self-destructive behaviors of animals, (ii) interdisciplinary work on
animal emotions, (iii) work on animal ethics, and (iv) philosophical work on animality. I
conclude in section 5 (Concluding Remarks) with some reflections about the respective
This includes Soper & Shackleford’s observation that scorpions cannot sting themselves and Ristau’s
warning about interpreting animal behavior as “ritualistic.”
2 This is true of Eilam’s and Hadley’s comments about intention and judgment.
3 This applies to commentaries that discussed the evolution of suicide (Preti, Racine, deCatanzaro, and Soper
& Shackelford) and the philosophy of existence (Kuperus and Hediger), and those that offered suggestions
for further research (Lester and Jensvold).
1
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dangers of anthropomorphism and anthropodenial in scientific debates about animal
sentience, cognition, and behavior.
1. What Is Suicide?
Most of us have no problem conjuring up clear cases of suicide. Yet, for every easy case there
seem to be twice as many hard ones about which perfectly reasonable people disagree. 4
Consider the following hard cases:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Should my decision to hasten my death if I have an incurable disease count as suicide?
What if I refuse to eat food or drink water for political or religious reasons and die as result?5
Is dying from grief suicide?6
Is dying in a kamikaze mission or a suicide bombing suicide?7
Is it suicide if I, knowing this is likely to end in my death, point a gun at a police officer?
What if my battalion is about to be massacred and I leave my hiding spot to defend it even
though I know that I, too, will die in the slaughter?
And what about “honor suicides,” such as the old Indian practice of suttee in which women
were expected to self-immolate on their husbands’ pyre — are they really suicides given that
they were culturally compelled?

Our intuitions about these cases diverge because suicide is an extremely complex
phenomenon. On the one hand, each suicide is opaque and we can never claim to fully
understand it. On the other, suicides as a class are astonishingly diverse in the sense that
many suicides don’t seem to have much in common with one another.
The opacity of the One and the diversity of the Many frustrate our attempts to define
suicide and pin down its necessary and sufficient conditions. Those who try quickly realize
that most definitions work well for some but not all cases. Some then react to this realization
by losing themselves in a sea of analytic distinctions whose objective is to save the definitions
rather than the phenomena. 8 Unfortunately, these analytic maneuvers, which sometimes
amount to little more than piling epicycles upon epicycles, never quite succeed in capturing
all — only the cases researchers want to capture. It is almost as if the more tightly experts try
to grasp the phenomenon, the more it slips between theirs fingers: as if the more they try to
corral it into a neat set of conditions, the more opaque and diverse suicide becomes.
The commentaries on my target article demonstrate the colossal difficulty of reaching
definitional consensus. Hadley, for example, defines suicide in terms of anguish, which
excludes cases that do not involve anguish (e.g., suicide bombers). Eilam incorporates mental
time-travel into his definition of suicide, but explicitly excludes grief-related deaths. Both of
them describe suicide as intentionally choosing to die (which makes suicide dependent on
Den Hartogh (2016) notes that we disagree even about the easiest case: “rational suicide.” This happens when
someone in full possession of their mental faculties and not in a state of anguish makes arrangements for death.
Rational suicides “tend not to be registered as suicides at all.”
5 Velazquez (1987) says the answer varies.
6 Benvenuti says yes. Eilam says no.
7 It is for Preti, but not for Hadley.
8 Common distinctions in the literature include: real vs. apparent suicide, suicidal attempt vs. suicidal
completion, intended vs. unintended completion, motivated vs. unmotivated attempts, serious vs. trivial
attempts, suicidal attempts vs. suicidal gestures, suicides vs. parasuicides, among others.
4
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rationality, choice, and intentionality). But, as Pierce observes, we can also describe suicide
as losing the will to live, a description that is gaining favor in animal hospice and palliative
care contexts (and which does not tie suicide to rationality, choice, and intentionality). In light
of so much disagreement, it is no surprise that some suicide researchers have moved in the
exact opposite direction and opted to forgo definitions altogether (Hawton & Van Heeringen
2000, pp. 319-325).
Science, of course, needs definitions. But Jensvold is right that too much emphasis on
definitions can lead us into futile semantic squabbles. And the danger is particularly high in
the animal sciences. If we worry too much about what to call different animal behaviors, we
can miss the behaviors themselves. So, instead of expecting the behaviors of animals to fit
neatly into our ready-made categories, we should study these behaviors with the knowledge
that we may have to tweak our categories as we go along. When we don't give ourselves this
flexibility, we end up ordering the world around our concepts rather than ordering our
concepts around the world. Thus, like Jensvold, I propose we settle for elastic and operational
definitions that can be stretched in light of new findings rather than static and a priori
definitions. Nature, after all, does not give a hoot about human dictionaries.9
In this spirit, I defined suicide in the original article as a continuum of self-directed and
injurious behaviors that can seriously endanger or terminate the life-activity of an organism.
Three aspects of this definition are worth accentuating:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

it defines suicide behaviorally, i.e., in terms of observable behaviors rather than
unobservable mental states
it does not require, but also does not reject, conscious intent, and
it does not limit suicide to humans.

I do not advocate this leap from the mental to the behavioral because I embrace the tenets of
classical behaviorism (à la Skinner) but because I have serious meta-methodological
reservations about what it means to study nonhuman behavior. One of these is that we (we,
humans) often assume that only we are intentional beings without ever reflecting on what
might possibly count as evidence of intentionality in other species.
Baum puts his finger on this meta-methodological problem with a clever thought
experiment, which I adapt and express in paraphrase here:
Imagine for a moment that you are not a human being looking at the self-destructive
behaviors of a dolphin, but rather a dolphin looking at the self-destructive behaviors
of a human. What will you, a member of the Delphinidae family, say about the selfdestructive behaviors of Homo sapiens? Will you say that Homo sapiens just harm
themselves or that they commit suicide?

The answer, it turns out, will depend on the kind of dolphin you are. If you are the kind of
dolphin that demands direct evidence of intentionality in other species before you accept that
they are capable of suicide, you will conclude that nondolphins cannot commit suicide. Why?
Because, as a dolphin, you presumably live and interact regularly with other dolphins, whom
you naturally view as intentional beings. But, as a dolphin, you also look at the world through
De Waal (2016) argues that too much emphasis on definitions is often a symptom of anthropocentrism (p.
157).
9
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a uniquely delphinic point of view, as only a dolphin can. You cannot access nondolphin
experience or extract linguistic reports from nondolphins about the contents of their
experience. Simply put, you have zero direct evidence of nondolphin intentionality because
don’t know “what it is like” to be a nondolphin. So, when asked whether nondolphins commit
suicide, you conclude, “Absolutely not.” But this conclusion, obvious as it may seem to you,
will be mistaken. But you, a dolphin, will not see this error as long as you demand direct
evidence of nondolphin suicide (which, by nature, you cannot have).
To avoid this false belief from the outset you will have to change your whole outlook:
you will have to adopt a behavioral rather than a mentalistic approach to the issue since the
mentalistic one, given the inescapability of your own delphinic cognitive apparatus, is already
a trap. You will also have to accept indirect evidence of nondolphin suicide and recognize the
limits of your dolphin-centric worldview, not to mention abstain from Delphinidae-centric
definitions of suicide (that define it, say, in terms of voluntary breathing). In short, you will
have to be the kind of dolphin that takes behavioral parallels between dolphins and
nondolphins seriously and is willing, at least in principle, to revise his or her beliefs in light
of new findings. My article encourages us to be this kind of dolphin (a sentence I never
thought I’d write).
Notice that Baum’s thought experiment does not turn on the empirical question of
whether we can, to quote the fictional Elizabeth Costello, “think ourselves into the being of
another” (Coetzee 1999, p. 35) — in this case a dolphin. Rather, it turns on the metamethodological insight that absence of direct evidence is not direct evidence of absence
because when it comes to intentionality in other species, the notion of evidence is itself in
question. When debating whether other species can commit suicide, we cannot assume from
the get-go that they are not intentional. What we need to do is be cognizant of the limits of
our own species-specific perspective and, to the extent that this is humanly possible, try to view
things from another angle. Basically, we need to put ourselves (conceptually) in the shoes of
an extra-terrestrial:
“What if, instead of looking at dolphins’ self-injurious behavior and likening it to human
behavior, we imagine what a dolphin might say when looking at human self-injurious
behavior. Better yet, suppose a Martian were looking at both human and dolphin selfinjurious behavior. This nonhuman would observe that human creatures and dolphins
usually avoid harm to themselves, but sometimes engage in self-injurious behavior,
sometimes even to the point of death. Lethal self-injurious behavior would be seen as a
subcategory of the more general category” (Baum, p. 2)

The Martian’s definition is my definition. For me, as for Baum’s Martian, suicide is an
interspecies continuum of self-destructive behaviors, some of which culminate in death.
2. What Makes Us So Special (and Suicidal)?
My core argument is that there is no “special something” that makes us, and only us, capable
of suicide. Numerous commentators, however, argue that such a magical ingredient exists
and, at various points, nominate three different candidates: conscious intent, judgment, and
theory of mind (ToM).

4
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Conscious Intent. The single most common concern critics express is that I exclude
intentionality from my definition of suicide. “The intention to die,” says Preti, “is central in
the definition of suicide in humans.” For a number of reasons, however, my theory is not
based on the concept of intent.
First, intentions are inaccessible to empirical investigation. It is impossible to know
when a particular intention is present or absent. This is true of the intentions of other people
and our own. We all like to think that there is a reason behind our actions and that we have
unequivocal first-hand access to them through introspection. But research in psychology,
cognitive science, and neurobiology shows that a great deal of human behavior is brought
about by unconscious processes of which we are largely unaware. These processes, which
include implicit biases, emotional and affective states, unconscious desires, and ingrained
habits, shape our behavior without our knowledge and render suspect our quotidian faith in
the rational and intentional character of our actions.10 According to Benvenuti, “it is now
widely recognized that cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes often unfold
unconsciously and that this unconscious processing frees up limited processing resources.”11
These processes throw a wrench in the folk-psychological belief that we always know why
we do what we do. They demonstrate the degree to which we are, to quote Kristeva (1991),
“strangers to ourselves.”
Second, there are two ways to think about intentions. They can be mental states that
exist alongside behavior (the weak version) or mental states that cause behavior (strong
version). Those who define suicide in terms of a particular intuition (like the intent to die)
must specify whether this intention needs to be present at the moment of death or whether
it also needs to be the cause of suicidal action. For my death to count as suicide, is it enough
for me to intend to die and then die, or do I have to die because I intended to die? Semantically,
the difference is almost negligible. Conceptually, it is enormous. Entire classes of self-killings
— e.g., kamikaze suicides and what Preti (2006) dubs “suicides with a hostile intent” — may
or may not count as suicides depending on which version we embrace.
Third and finally, intentions do not always cause behavior. In the target article, I cited
neuroscientific, phenomenological, and philosophical theories of action — especially
Merleau-Ponty (2012), Searle (1983), and Libet (1999) — that decouple intention from
action. These theories show “there are real cases in which intent appears either at the same
time as (in actu) or even after (ex-post facto) the behavior it supposedly causes” (PeñaGuzmán 2017, p. 14). These theories turn the epistemological problem discussed above into
an ontological one. It is not just that we cannot know when an intention is present or absent.
It is that intentions, even if they are present and accessible, may be epiphenomenal. They may
not precede the behavior they are thought to explain. If so, explaining a suicide by pointing
to a particular intention may be epistemologically on par with explaining rain by pointing to
the wetness of the streets.12

In cases of suicide, the problem of self-knowledge is compounded by the fact that suicidal agents are often in
the throes of mental illness, substance abuse problems, and psychopathologies of various kinds.
11 Benvenuti cites Antonio Damasio, who places unconscious affects and emotions (rather than rational beliefs
and conscious intentions) at the root of our cognitive life. Damasio’s “affective neuroscience” has contributed to
the “return of the unconscious” in contemporary neuroscience (Franks 2003).
12 Only Racine engages my critiques of intentionality. Yet, the position he develops is puzzling. Essentially, he
says we should keep intent at the center of suicidal theories even if suicidal intent forms after the onset of
10
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The idea that suicides could exist that do not involve a conscious intent to die is not a
purely logical possibility. Lester uses “victim-perpetrated suicide,” which occurs when an
individual wishes to die but is not actually conscious of this wish, as a candidate for
unintentional suicide. In these cases, “it may be possible to conceptualize the [victim’s]
behavior as suicidal even though the deceased had no conscious suicidal impulses.” In
support of this claim, he cites the research of the American psychiatrist Karl Menninger
(1938), who argues that “unconscious and self-destructive desires” motivate some suicides.
In Man Against Himself (1938), Menninger warns against reducing all suicides to something
as simplistic as the conscious intent to die.
“Paradoxically, many suicides in spite of the violence of the attack upon themselves do
not seem to be very eager to die. Every hospital interne [sic] has labored in the emergency
ward with would-be suicides, who beg him to save their lives. The fact that dying and
being murdered achieve the same end so far as personal extinction is concerned, leads
the practical-minded individuals to think, ‘If a person wants to murder himself, or if he
feels he is willing to be murdered, then he surely must want to die.’ But the illustration
just given is only one of many indications that this is not so…. In attempted suicide the
wish to die may or may not be present or may be present to a quite variable degree”
(Menninger 1938, p. 23).

In this passage, Menninger finds himself in the company of Émile Durkheim (1897), who
asserts in Le Suicide that not all people who commit suicide actually wish to die. He mentions
soldiers who run into battle to save their regiment while knowing this will result in their
death, martyrs who die for the tenets of their faith, and mothers who sacrifice themselves for
their children. Baum adds suicide by police to this list. All these suicides prove that conscious
intent “need not be a component of all suicide explanations” (Peña-Guzmán 2017, p. 15).
I never meant to imply that intent is a worthless concept. On this point, I probably
wasn’t as clear as I should have been. Ristau, as a result, argues that I am “of two minds”
about it: on the one hand, I dismiss it as an explanatory aid in suicide research; on the other,
I defend my position by claiming that some animals “sustain intentions,” which presupposes
that intent matters. But this contradiction is only apparent. What I dismiss is not intent per
se (although I do think it begets theoretical complications), but intent conceived as a necessary
condition for suicide. Intent can be a useful heuristic in many cases, especially when
cognitively sophisticated organisms (such as primates, cetaceans, and elephants) are
involved. I agree it would be hard to make sense of some suicides, such as the suicide of the
Vietnamese monk Thích Quảng Đức, without considering the mental states of the
protagonists — their intentions, beliefs, and desires. But this does not mean that we need this
concept every single time. For example, I also agree it would be hard to make sense of some
suicides without invoking alcoholism, depression, or brain trauma as causes, but this does
not mean that alcoholism, depression, or brain trauma are necessary conditions for suicide
as a whole. The same, for me, is true of intent. Here, we need to watch out for the mereological
fallacy (from the Greek méros meaning “part” + logos meaning “study”), which occurs when
we conflate what is true of the part with what is true of the whole.

suicidal behavior. But why keep this concept if it does not explain the behavior in question? This conception of
intent has no explanatory value as intentions could not reasonably be construed as causes.

6
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Mikhalevich, however, is unconvinced that a theory of suicide can work without
intentionality. By getting rid of intent, she says, I pack too much into the category of suicide
and end up grouping together behaviors with “radically different causal histories and
ecological significance.”13 She highlights the dangers of this tactic using an analogy of rape.
When we talk about rape, we must not group together behaviors that seem similar but are
actually very different. We must be especially vigilant of adaptationist accounts of rape that
put rape on a continuum with other sex-related behaviors in humans and nonhuman animals.
Such adaptationist narratives pass over “the social and psychological context in which most
rapes occur, including the non-sexual motivations of many rapists,” effectively “naturalizing”
rape.
I agree with Mikhalevich about rape, but not about suicide. Rape, on my view (and, I
assume, hers) is about power, not sex; and evolutionary accounts that “biologize” it are
harmful. But why do we agree about rape? Because we agree that all rapes originate in the
perpetrator’s desire to dominate another, i.e., because we agree that all rapes share a
common underlying etiology. This is exactly what I don’t concede about suicide. Suicides do
not have a common underlying etiology. Different suicides have “radically different causal
histories” that involve causal factors such as alcoholism, depression, SSRIs, existential angst,
drug addiction, moments of insanity, social exclusion, intent to harm others, loss of the will
to live, delusions, and more. If anything, it is Mikhalevich herself who groups dissimilar things
together with this rape analogy since rape and suicide are not analogous in the relevant way.
I can accept an intentional interpretation of rape in which what matters are the non-sexual
motivations of perpetrators, but this does not mean I must also accept an intentional
interpretation of suicide. I can be a causal pluralist about suicide but not about rape. In order
for her observation that I group together behaviors with different etiologies to pack a punch,
Mikhalevich would have to defend the claim that all suicides do share an underlying etiology,
which she has yet to do.14
Judgment. Hadley defends the anthropocentric conception of suicide using the concept of
judgment. Even if many nonhuman animals are cognitively complex, he says, only humans
commit “run-of-the-mill-suicide” because only humans make judgments.
“I presuppose that to take one’s life, in the relevant sense for a discussion of animal
suicide, is for an individual to do so under conditions of anguish — after making a
judgment that one’s life is not worth living. It is the wherewithal for making such a
judgment, in the absence of compelling empirical evidence to the contrary, that it is
reasonable to believe animals lack” (Hadley, p. 1).

Hadley’s position is that to commit suicide, a subject must be in a state of anguish. Then, after
carefully and rationally considering her future prospects, she must judge her life as unworthy
of being lived. When these conditions click into place, one has “run-of-the-mill-suicide.” But
Mikhalevich also accuses me of overestimating the degree to which “mind” is either exclusively human or
widespread throughout nature. While I believe that mind is not exclusively human, the vast continuum I
describe is a continuum of self-destructive behavior, not of mental capabilities.
14 Mikhalevich calls for suicidologists to “parse out” the suicides of different species based on shared causal
factors (such as intentions, social-ecological context, or evolutionary history), but suicidologists can’t, and
won’t, do this if they don’t first embrace some form of continuity.
13
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only humans can make these kinds of judgments which require having mental states with the
appropriate content. I find Hadley’s objection intriguing, but in the end unconvincing. Here, I
respond to it on its own terms before questioning its underlying assumptions.
Sadly, Hadley never specifies what “content” he has in mind (no pun intended).
Presumably, for run-of-the-mill suicide, an individual would need two capacities: (a) mental
time travel capabilities (to imagine her future prospects) and (b) a sense of what, for them,
constitutes a good life (to know that hers isn’t it). Assuming this is true, I do not see why
animals should be automatically excluded. There is ample evidence that animals can plan for
the future in ways that “do not directly follow from present needs and desires” (de Waal 2016,
p. 213) and have expectations about what the future holds. Experiments on expectancy and
violation-of-expectation demonstrate that animals systematically express surprise when
their expectations are not met (Lurz 2011, pp. 116-120, 180-184). Animals look to the future,
consider it, and plan for it. Some of them, therefore, meet condition (a).
The trickier condition, of course, is (b). How could anyone believe, let alone prove, that
animals have a sense of the good life? The key lies in what we mean by “having a sense of the
good life.” Consider the following syllogism:
Premise 1. Chimpanzees have a concept of “death.”15
Premise 2. Chimpanzees have their own species-specific concepts of “good” and “bad”
(or “better” and “worse”).16
Premise 3. Chimpanzees can make judgments by combining concepts and subsuming
particulars under them.17
Conclusion. Chimpanzees may have a sense of what counts as a “good death” or a “bad
death” (by combining the appropriate concepts), and they may prefer the former to
the latter.

Now, as an exercise in formal logic, this syllogism may be all well and good. But do
chimpanzees really prefer some deaths to others as a matter of fact? Do they really
discriminate between good and bad deaths? Anderson et al. (2010) claim they do.
Chimpanzees prefer to die “in communion with others” rather than by themselves (PeñaGuzmán 2017, p. 17, fn. 27). For them, a lonely death is a bad death.
If chimpanzees have a concept of death, they could also have a concept of life
(although, to my knowledge, nobody has investigated the issue). If so, a version of the above
syllogism could be constructed such that chimpanzees have a sense of what counts as a “good
life” or a “bad life.” If they prefer some deaths to others, why couldn’t they also prefer some
lives to others? If they prefer to die with the chimpanzee analog of dignity, why couldn’t they
also prefer not to live without it? I know I am entering speculative territory here, but the point
is that it is not absurd to believe that some animals could meet Hadley’s condition (b), such
that we could meet Hadley’s objection on its own terms (even if only in an exceedingly small
number of cases).
See Anderson et al. (2010).
This is evidenced by the fact that chimpanzees have preferences and discriminate between things they like
and dislike. Research in primatology has shown that nonhuman primates even have a sense of “right” and
“wrong” (de Waal 2010; Brosnan 2013; Brosnan & de Waal 2012), the moral equivalents of good and bad.
17 This is a contentious claim, but chimpanzees can make judgments such as “Tommy is a good friend,” “Grapes
are a good food,” “The tree in the yard is a bad sleeping spot,” and “Peter is a cheater.” See Glock (2010).
15
16
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But we may not need to meet Hadley’s objection on its own terms since, on my view,
its terms are problematic. To begin with, Hadley favors an excessively mentalistic
understanding of judgment drawn from analytic philosophy of mind, according to which
judgments are thoughts composed of concepts. But since thoughts are typically defined in
this literature as having a propositional structure (“that X”), this view of judgment ostensibly
requires language, automatically excluding all nonhuman animals. The philosophical
framework within which Hadley’s objection operates, then, may itself be the problem.
In “Can Animals Judge?” the philosopher Hans-Johann Glock (2010) targets this
framework and claims that instead of fretting over whether animals have the right kinds of
mental states with the right kind of content for the formation of the right kinds of thoughts
with the right kind of structure, we should simply look at how animals interact with their
environment and decide whether it would make sense to ascribe certain thoughts (including
judgments) to them (even if such thoughts could not possibly have a propositional form
inside their minds) (p. 11). In the case of suicide, the self-injurious behaviors of animals may
justify ascribing certain judgments to animals (e.g., “that life is not good” or “that life is not
worth living”) without having to prove that animals can sustain propositional attitudes as a
matter of fact.
Putting this aside, another problem with Hadley’s commentary is his definition. As
noted above, he defines run-of-the-mill-suicide in terms of anguish and judgment. This
excludes a number of suicides that suicide researchers may not want to exclude, including all
human suicides not committed in a state of anguish (e.g., kamikaze suicides, suicide
bombings, suicides motivated by religious and political convictions, and rational suicides)
and all human suicides in which an explicit mental judgment about future prospects is
missing (e.g., impulsive suicides, child suicides, and the suicides of people in the grip of
addiction). What’s more, Hadley never specifies whether run-of-the-mill suicide (as he
understands it) is synonymous with suicide as a whole or denotes a special sub-class. Do nonrun-of-the-mill suicides exist, according to Hadley? I frankly cannot tell. Perhaps he thinks
that run-of-the-mill suicides are the gold standard of suicide. That’s fine. But this would not
prove that animals cannot commit suicide. It would only prove that they don’t commit runof-the-mill suicide. Maybe they just commit non-run-of-the-mill suicide, which would still be
suicide.18
Theory of Mind. Racine contends that suicide depends on having a “theory of mind” (ToM),
which only humans possess. This turn to ToM is unexpected since this concept does not play
a major role in the suicide literature, and probably for good reason. The idea that suicide
requires ToM capacities is at odds with the fact that there are humans who do not meet the
requirements of most ToM theories, such as people living on the higher end of the autism
spectrum, and who commit suicide nonetheless. 19 This alone refutes Racine’s claim that
“human ‘theory of mind’ capacities might be required for behavior to be considered suicidal”
The terms grounding Hadley’s definition, anguish and judgment, may also undermine one another. Perhaps
the more I sink into a state of anguish, the less I am capable of making a rational judgment about my future
prospects, and vice versa.
19 By most accounts, autism prevents people from recognizing other people as having a mind of their own.
People on the higher end of the spectrum fail the core requirement of virtually every ToM theory (Moran et al.
2011; Baron-Cohen 1997). Yet, they commit suicide — and in high numbers (Mayes et al. 2013; Dweerdt
2014).
18
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(p. 2). Even if this weren’t so, we could flip the argument around since there is vast, and
growing, literature showing that many animals display ToM-relevant capacities, such as
deception, shared intentionality, targeted help, joint attention, teaching, and empathy (Wise
2000, pp. 194-217; Suddendorf & Buby 2003; Zentall 2006).
In general, theories of ToM fall into two categories: low-expectation theories (LETs)
and high-expectation theories (HETs). LETs define ToM as understanding that others have
intentions. HETs are more demanding and define ToM as understanding that others have a
mind and understanding “intentions in general” (i.e., having a concept of intention). Whether
(and which) animals have ToM capacities will depend on whether we adopt a LET or a HET.
Under most LETs, even pre-verbal infants have an implicit ToM (Gómez 1996; 2007). So, it is
reasonable to assume that a good number of animals do too.
But Racine adopts a HET. According him, having a ToM requires viewing others as
intentional beings and understanding intentions “in general.” In support of this
interpretation, he cites the work of Michael Tomasello, who argues that chimpanzees do not
understand intentions “in general.” Racine interprets this to mean that only humans
understand intentions and thus are capable of suicide. Although I cannot offer a detailed
critique of Tomasello’s research program here, Racine ignores that this program, by
Tomasello’s own admission, only proves that chimpanzees cannot grasp communicative
intentions, not that they do not understand basic intentions in general (Zlatev et al. 2013, p.
313). It also ignores Leavens, Bard, and Hopkins’s (2017) claim that Tomasello’s flawed
methodology invalidates his conclusions.
3. The Evolution of Suicide
Although the original article does not deal with evolution, its continuity thesis operates
within a broadly Darwinian framework. This prompted some commentators to inquire into
the relationship between evolution and suicide. As there was no consensus about how (or
even whether) suicide evolved by natural selection, in this section, I explain the various
positions that surfaced while pinpointing problems with those that sought to rescue the
anthropocentric theory of suicide with evolutionary hypotheses.
Racine claims that leading adaptationist explanations of suicide, such as deCatanzaro
(1995) and Tanaka and Kinney (2001), do not support the continuity thesis. These theories
may prove that suicidal behavior is “heritable in humans” and has “a potential adaptive
function,” but not that it is found in other species. “Although [adaptationist] hypotheses might
capture something of the ancestral condition of anatomically modern humans,” he writes,
“they leave open the question of whether these explanations would automatically support
the continuity thesis.”
The idea, roughly, is that suicidal behavior emerged after modern-day humans split
off from our closest evolutionary ancestors and is thus the exclusive evolutionary
achievement of Homo sapiens.
Unfortunately, Racine’s claim that leading adapationist theories do not support a
continuist paradigm is simply false. DeCatanzaro (1995) and Tanaka and Kinney (2001) both
allow for interspecies continuity. DeCatanzaro, whose sociobiological theory of suicide rests
on inclusive fitness, believes that some animals can commit suicide, even if he limits this to
big-brained creatures such as dolphins. Tanaka and Kinney (2001), who impute the adaptive
value of suicide to the protection of kin from infectious diseases, allow suicidal behavior in
10
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other species, especially those “that live in complex social communities” (p. 986).
Contemporary adaptationist theories of suicide, therefore, already accommodate the animal
suicide hypothesis.
Preti, like Racine, defends this latecomer view of suicide and says that suicide
appeared on the evolutionary scene only quite recently, after the development of agriculture.
The advent of agriculture changed in radical ways how people lived and, among other things,
brought about the collapse of kin-centric life by making individuals in agricultural societies
live with people to whom they were not genetically related. By contrast, people in preagricultural societies lived in closely-knit kin-related groups similar to those found today in
the wild among nonhuman mammals. Since agriculture, then, humans have become
genetically isolated, “increasingly living in groups that are not as closely related genetically
as social groups of nonhuman mammals.” This isolation, Preti says, breeds suicide. Curiously,
Preti does not necessarily grant that suicide “is under genetic control.” What matters to him
is that agriculture caused a breakdown in kin relations and that this breakdown made suicide
possible either by producing psychopathologies that lead to suicide (in the version that does
not require a genetic component) or by giving the gene or genes for suicidal behavior an
adaptive value in this ancestral context (in the version that does). Either way, suicide is an
example of evolutionary discontinuity.
But Preti’s theory is open to some interpretation. If what ultimately leads to suicide is
the breakdown of kin-centric living in social animals, any social animals that live in kinunrelated groups could be susceptible to suicide. This would not include wild animals living
in kin-related groups, but it could include social animals trapped in laboratories, marine
parks, farms, menageries, zoos, and aquaria, often in ethologically impoverished
environments. Many of these animals suffer from the kinds of genetic isolation and
interpersonal conflict that, in Preti’s theory, snowball into suicide.
DeCatanzaro espouses this latter view. For him, individuals commit suicide when
they battle “social isolation and a sense of rejection, burdensomeness, and shame.” This battle
is waged on two fronts: a biochemical front that produces feelings of dysphoria and
despondency in socially unfit individuals, and a cognitive front that permits those same
individuals (assuming they are capable of voluntary action) to act on those feelings. 20
Although his is a theory of human suicide, deCatanzaro grants some animals, such as dolphins,
could fall under it. Biochemically, dolphins display the right kind of “affective variation.” They
show clear signs of dysphoria and despondency, feelings that “clearly have deep roots in
animal behavior and are not uniquely human.” Cognitively, they demonstrate capacities of
neo-cortical control, “which may allow insight into self and others, anticipation of
consequences of complex actions, future planning, and flexible voluntary behavior.” These
capacities could enable them to override their self-preservation instincts vis-a-vis suicide.
On deCatanzaro’s account, biological systems have self-preservation instincts, but
these are “not necessarily unconditional.” They can be overridden, a possibility Soper &
Shackelford find unacceptable. Suicide, they argue, could not have evolved in animals
because there are powerful and inviolable mechanisms that protect animals from selfdestruction. “Suicide is not observed in nonhumans,” they write, “for a straightforward
For deCatanzaro, suicide can be adaptive when “individuals encounter a conjunction of poor reproductive
prospects and burdensomeness towards kin” (p. 2). Suicide increases inclusive fitness by removing from the
evolutionary space organisms that are a burden to the germ-line.
20
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reason: any genes that permitted suicide would have been eliminated along with the suicides’
bodies.” Of course, Soper & Shackelford know that some animals do sacrifice their bodies, as
happens with the self-destructive behaviors of hymenoptera. But they work around this in a
somewhat bizarre manner. They dismiss these behaviors as irrelevant to the question of
suicide on the grounds that the reproductive strategy of hymenoptera allows us to explain
said behaviors in terms of kin selection, which proves they have nothing to do with suicide:
“Many organisms sacrifice their soma according to algorithms of inclusive fitness: nonbreeding siblings in eusocial colonies — hymenopteran insects, for example — often die
defending the colony; other organisms that breed only once have nothing to lose by dying
once their reproductive work is done.” The implication seems to be that if a species has the
kind of reproductive strategy that allows evolutionary theorists to explain their selfdestructive behaviors according to principles of inclusive fitness, then those behaviors are
not suicidal “in the meaningful sense of the word.”
What is bizarre is that immediately after arguing that hymenoptera cannot commit
suicide because they have a specific reproductive strategy, Soper & Shackelford argue that
dolphins cannot commit suicide because they don’t have the same reproductive strategy as
hymenoptera. The contradiction stems from the authors’ lack of clarity about the relationship
between suicidal behavior and inclusive fitness. On the one hand, they imply that acts of selfdestruction that enhance inclusive fitness are not suicides “in the meaningful sense of the
term.” 21 On the other hand, they seem to favor an adaptationist view of human suicide
(possibly anchored in inclusive fitness?) since they also critique my article for lacking a “a
coherent explanation as to how selection could favour and maintain such a capability [for
suicide in animals].” In the same breath, then, they criticize me for not providing an
adaptationist narrative while also claiming that such narratives would foreclose the
possibility of talking about suicide meaningfully. It does not help that they never specify what
suicide “in the meaningful sense of the term” actually means.22
4. Areas for Further Research
Based on the commentators’ critiques and feedback, I have identified four areas for further
research. Work in these areas may give us a better understanding of the relationship between
animals and suicide.
Empirical Work on the Self-Destructive Behaviors of Animals. Some may believe that it
is impossible to study animal suicide empirically because we cannot access the minds of
nonhuman animals. Lester, however, invites us to envision empirical protocols that may bear
Some theories explain human suicide in terms of inclusive fitness, such as deCatanzaro’s (1995) and Tanaka
and Kinney’s (2001). If human suicide can be given an inclusive fitness explanation (like the self-killings of
hymenoptera), Soper & Shackelford might be forced to conclude that humans also don’t commit suicide “in the
meaningful sense of the word.”
22 They do say humans have crossed a “cognitive floor” that makes suicide possible. What this floor is, we do not
know. All we know is that it happens “around puberty and involves ‘conception.’” What does conception entail?
We also do not know. Either way, to make this floor hold up, Soper & Shackelford would need to clarify six
things: (1) what they mean by “conception,” (2) whether it involves specific mental states and mental concepts
(and which), (3) whether it needs to temporally precede the act, (4) whether all humans reach it or only
neurotypical ones, (5) why we ought to assume that only humans reach it, and (6) whether it leaves room for
evolutionary explanations rooted in inclusive fitness.
21
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directly on the question of whether animals can commit suicide. He uses Schaeffer (1967) as
an example. Schaeffer claims that researchers can shed an empirical light on animal suicide
by tackling three questions: “(1) Can the animal discriminate between life and death or, to be
more specific, between a live animal and a dead animal? (2) Can an animal discriminate
between a lethal and a nonlethal environment? (3) Under what circumstances will an animal
choose to enter a lethal environment?”
In the 1960s, Schaeffer used an operant conditioning technique on laboratory mice to
address these questions. In the protocol, mice were presented with two chambers: a lethal
chamber in which the mice who entered would be brutally killed by electrocution and a nonlethal chamber in which the mice were left unharmed. Schaeffer wanted to see whether mice
would detect the difference; he found that mice who observed other mice enter the lethal
chamber and die subsequently avoided the chamber altogether. According to him, this
suggests that mice discriminate between living and dead conspecifics and between lethal and
nonlethal environments. This approach shows that animal suicide can be studied empirically
(though one hopes it can be studied without hurting or killing animals or imprisoning them
in laboratories).
Jensvold also makes a plea for further empirical research on suicidal behavior, but
she uses comparative sign language studies as a model. She writes:
“The successes of sign language studies with cross-fostered chimpanzees came from
treating them under comparable conditions and using the same measures of language
acquisition in infant chimpanzees as the ones used in human children…. Similar methods
can be applied to suicide. What behaviors constitute suicide? Which of these behaviors
appear in humans? Which of them appear in nonhumans? Through clear operational
definitions of behaviors and an understanding of Darwinian principles, we can come to
understand what constitutes suicide and how it is manifested” (Jensvold, p. 2).

This is a valuable suggestion. While there are better and worse ways of studying language
acquisition in nonhumans (Wise 2000, pp. 172-178), this field can teach us invaluable lessons
about how to study animal behavior, such as the importance of beginning from behavior
rather than a priori definitions, of recognizing that how humans do X need not be how other
animals do X, of being attentive to researcher bias, and of not reaching grand conclusions
from negative findings.
Interdisciplinary Work on Animal Emotions. One of the virtues of the cognitive revolution
in the study of human behavior was that it brought into sharp relief the importance of
different kinds of mental states, including emotional ones. (For a critique of the cognitive
revolution, see Thomas who advocates cataloguing the “psychochemical changes” in the
central nervous system [CNS] instead of talking about mental states without distinct
psychochemical CNS correlates).
While many scientists nowadays accept that emotions influence human behavior,
skepticism about animal emotions abounds. The best way to combat this skepticism is by
giving emotions, especially negative ones, a more prominent place in our list of research
priorities (de Waal 2016, p. 273). But since all emotions have physiochemical,
neurobiological, and psycho-social dimensions (Nussbaum 2003), this research has to go
beyond Thomas’s “CNS physiochemical substrates” and combine physiochemical,
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neurobiological, ethological, psychological, and even philosophical insights. If done correctly
and ethically, this research could pay dividends to psychology, evolutionary cognition, animal
behavior, neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind.
Recent work on “complicated grief” among animals illustrates the value of taking
animal emotions seriously. Grief is a reaction to a devastating loss that triggers feelings of
anxiety, guilt, sadness, and despair. As individuals comes to accept the irreversibility of their
loss, these feelings gradually disappear until the individual forms new emotional attachments
and returns to a normal or semi-normal life. Complicated grief works differently. Complicated
grief is a reaction to loss in which individuals, for causes still unknown, cannot accept the loss
and adjust to their new reality. They are in denial about the loss.23 While the literature on
complicated grief has historically assumed that only humans are capable of this complex
emotion state, recent research paints a different picture.
According to Brooks Pribac, different “attachment styles” contribute to complicated
grief. Animals with an “insecure attachment style,” as defined by Fraley and Shaver (2016),
may have the kind of brain organization that cannot properly cope with a devastating loss.
Animals who have an insecure attachment style (say, on account of being denied speciestypical upbringing) and who suffer a tragic loss (say, the loss of a lifetime companion) may
experience complicated grief. This could explain why some dogs starve themselves to death
after the death of their human companions (Brooks Pribac, p. 1).
Eilam agrees with Brooks Pribac on this point and cites the tragic case of Flint
reported in Goodall (1996). After a female chimpanzee named Flo died, her son Flint entered
a deep depression and lost the will to live. Goodall (1996) writes:
“For Flint, Flo’s death was a blow from which he never recovered. It was as though,
without his mother, he no longer had the will to live. Hunched and miserable, he sat on
the bank of the stream near his Flo’s body. From time to time he approached her,
searching, it seemed, for a sign of life. He stared at her, then pulled at her hand as though
begging her to groom him, to comfort him, as she had done throughout his life. But Flo’s
body lay motionless — cold and dead. Finally, Flint moved away. His depression
worsened. He ate almost nothing, he stayed mostly alone, and in this state of grief he fell
sick. We tried to help Flint in his sickness and misery. We took him food and stayed with
him so that he would not feel utterly alone. But nothing helped, and about three weeks
after Flo died, Flint died, too. It seems that because Flo had been too old to force the
spoiled Flint to become independent, he simply couldn’t face life without her” (quoted in
Eilam, p. 3).

Eilam interprets Flint’s inability to cope with his mother’s death as a case of complicated grief
analogous to the case of “dogs that have lost their human.” Both cases fit under Kü bler-Ross's
(2007) model of grief. In both, “the depression phase is followed by an acceptance phase that
represents an understanding of the finality of death. In extended grief, as reflected in endless
depression, the individual remains stuck in the depression phase or even regresses to
preceding phases (e.g., denial) rather than progressing toward acceptance.”
Eilam and Brooks Pribac, I should clarify, are not on the same page about animal
suicide. But their disagreement, I think, is essential because it throws into relief the
Freud (1959) calls this condition “melancholia,” which occurs when the patient cannot accept the sudden
absence of a “cathexed” object and re-organize their own libidinal economy.
23
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importance of comparative research on negative animal emotions for people on both sides of
the debate. Other negative emotions and psychopathologies that should be further studied
(under ethical conditions) among animals include PTSD, normal grief, depression,
schizophrenia, anguish, chronic anxiety, anhedonia, learned helplessness, and lethargy.
Work on Animal Ethics. Scientific research on animal cognition, behavior, and sentience
never raises solely scientific questions. Because we regularly justify our treatment of animals
based on assumptions about what animals can and cannot do, any research that challenges
these assumptions will automatically have ethical ramifications. Science and ethics,
therefore, stand in a dialectical relationship. Scientific discoveries influence ethical norms
and ethical norms influence what constitutes acceptable scientific research. In the target
article, I nod at this dialectical bond by noting that animal suicide raises uniquely ethical
questions about our duties to animals: “If certain animals are shown by future research to be
statistically more likely to self-destruct in certain environments, we may have a moral duty
to change those environments or relocate the animals” (Peña-Guzmán 2017, p. 17).
Glymour thinks my ethical conclusions do not go far enough. If some animals really
self-destruct under certain situations, we may have an obligation to not just change their
environments, but to make the means for suicidal completion available to them. He grounds
this provocative claim on the philosophical principle that each individual has “absolute moral
authority” over its life because only the individual knows when enough is enough: “No one
knows another’s inner life so well as the other.” And since each individual is the moral master
of its own life, it would be morally wrong to force someone who has lost the will to live to go
on living. To do so would be to violate their moral authority. When someone has lost the will
to live and wishes to die, the right thing to do is help them realize their desire and make sure
they have at their disposal the most effective and least painful means of suicide possible.24
With animals, of course, the trick is making these means available without creating a hazard
for animals that may want to live since the last thing we want is to do is create lethal hazards
for non-suicidal animals. Before we make lethal options available to animals, we need to
know they can differentiate between lethal and non-lethal options, which is not easy to do.
Pierce also discusses ethics, but from the standpoint of animal palliative care. On her
view, the target article can help us better understand, as she puts it, “who animals are as dying
patients.” Animals, of course, die all the time. Sometimes they die as scapegoats, sometimes
as food, sometimes as subjects of pharmacological research. But sometimes they die as
patients, which is to say, at the hands of a medical expert in a context of care delivery.
Unfortunately, we haven’t properly wrestled with the ethical quandaries of the deaths of
animals. We forget that animals have an active interest in dying well and with dignity, “[that]
they, too, play a role in the drama of their own passing.” And because we forget this, we make
unilateral decisions about how and when they die without considering their needs, wishes,
and interests, even when the moral gravity of our decisions shakes us to our very core. We
don’t have a robust ethical framework, an animal bioethics, to deal with animals in the throes
of illness and at the end of life. But we desperately need one if we want to make ethical use of
what Pierce calls “the needle of oblivion.” For Pierce, research on animal suicide may be a
From the standpoint of ethical theory, Glymour’s position is ambiguous. What is the status of the duty he
describes? Is this a duty of justice or of benevolence? His notion of moral authority suggests that we are all moral
equals in this regard and that it would be unjust (not just unkind) to deny others the capacity to commit suicide.
Yet, Glymour himself describes this duty in terms of kindness rather than justice.
24
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place to start since it “has immediate and practical implications for veterinary medicine and
for humans who share their lives with animals and have committed themselves, as many of
us have, to seeing our companions through, all the way to the bitter end.”
Philosophical Work on Animality. The debate about animal suicide is, at least in part, a
philosophical debate that impacts multiple sub-branches of philosophy, including ethics
(What are my duties to animals?), metaphysics (What is the nature of animal experience?),
and epistemology (What can I, a human, know about a nonhuman “Other”?). In this section, I
work through some of the philosophical questions raised by commentators.
Kuperus, whose focus is on the philosophical concept of temporality, brings the
discussion directly to a metaphysical register. While supporting my continuist framework, he
worries that the original article lacks a substantial “engagement with time.” To understand
whether animal suicide makes sense philosophically, we need to answer two questions about
how animals experience time:
1. Do animals relate to time that has been? That is to say, do they remember the past?
2. Do animals relate to time as such? Do they know, in other words, that they are going to die?

The first of these questions has to do with memory: the second, with finitude. Let us work
through them one at a time.
The issue of memory is paramount. If animals cannot remember the past — if they are
“trapped in the present,” to quote Nietzsche — they may be constitutionally incapable of
suicide because, for Kuperus, suicide is connected to memory through trauma. Suicide
involves some form of trauma or anguish, but there can be no trauma without memory since
I can’t suffer from what I can’t remember. So, if we are going to talk about animal suicide, we
need to figure out whether animals can actually remember the past and be burdened by it.
Animal cognition research suggests that many animals can. Researchers have found
evidence of short-term, long-term, eidetic, and even episodic memory in species as diverse as
birds, primates, and cephalopods (de Waal 2016; Dere et al. 2006; Veyrac et al. 2015), as well
as evidence that some animals can be “traumatized” by their own memories of past events. A
good example of this is that crows remember the humans who harmed them in the past. A
better one is elephant PTSD (Bradshaw 2009). Young elephants who witness human
poachers butcher their family members cannot erase these gruesome memories from their
mind. These memories burden and haunt them during the day and often “return” at night in
the form of nightmares and night terrors (Masson 2009), re-traumatizing the calves.
But what about Kuperus’s second philosophical question? Do animals relate to what
the German philosopher Martin Heidegger calls “time as such”? Do they understand, as
Kuperus puts it, that time is not just “ticking,” but “ticking away”? Obviously, this is not the
kind of query that can be settled definitively one way or the other. Still, there are different
ways to approach it, some better than others.
One way is to recast this existential question in cognitive terms and ask: What mental
concepts would be required for this kind of Heideggerian anxiety? And could some animals
possess them?25 At its most basic level, Heideggerian anxiety grows out of the realization that
Heidegger would turn in his grave at the thought of reformulating the philosophy of existence in cognitivist
language since he believed that “Being as such” (ontology) escapes all conceptual categories, especially those of
positive science.
25
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I, too, will one day die. It is the realization that I am continually approaching non-existence.
On a cognitivist reconstruction, two concepts seem to be involved: the concept of self and the
concept of death. The synthesis of these concepts (self + death) may be what brings about that
aha! moment (or, rather, ahh! moment) in which I realize that I, too, will one day die. In the
target article, I showed that some animals have a concept of self, some have a concept of
death, and some — e.g., nonhuman primates, some birds, and marine mammals — have both.
In theory, animals in this last category could experience something akin to Heideggerian
anxiety if they brought these concepts together in one thought. This, however, strikes me as
a far-fetched possibility.
Thankfully, there is another way to approach the question that does not turn on
believing that animals experience the kind of anxiety described by philosophers such as
Kierkergaard, Heidegger, and Camus. 26 On this view, which is a form of metaphysical
pluralism, instead of assuming that the structures through which temporality is disclosed to
living beings are the same for all species, we should embrace the possibility that temporality
discloses itself differently to different species. Different animals experience time differently.
Maybe elephants, octopuses, and crocodiles will never experience Heideggerian anxiety (or
Beckettian absurdism or Sartrean negation or whatever), but so what? Why should their lived
experience of time be subject to the same organization as ours? My inclination is to say that
nonhuman animals inhabit a temporality wholly alien to us, an allotemporality that we
perhaps cannot even fathom.27 To quote Berger (2009), the animal descends upon the human
world “from over the horizon,” from an unthinkable and utterly inhuman beyond.
5. Concluding Remarks
The charge of anthropomorphism is common in the field of animal studies. It is easy and
powerful — too easy and too powerful, in fact. Often it is hurled carelessly and without
support, even though its actual track record in the sciences is not particularly impressive. Let
us not forget that this charge has historically been made, and quite violently, against scientists
who challenge disciplinary dogma. Jane Goodall was viciously attacked for decades for saying
chimpanzees have personalities. Donald Griffin was similarly ridiculed for saying animals
have mental states. The late Jaak Panksepp reported being afraid to publish his findings on
rat sociality out of fear of professional ostracism. More often than not, this charge is a tactic
used to marginalize perfectly legitimate hypotheses that put pressure on received wisdom.
The real threat to scientific progress, then, may not be anthropomorphism as much as what
Waal (2006) calls “anthropodenial,” “the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between
humans and animals” (Hediger, p. 2).
Some philosophers have argued that awareness of finitude is something that humans may not even have.
Hediger argues that death is, by its very nature, unknowable. Death “is not knowable to the living,” human or
otherwise. It is, as Mason (2015) says, an empty and object-less concept. Since death has no object, nothing can
be known about it. At most, Mason argues, we can form certain beliefs about death and speak of it
metaphorically, but we can never have any knowledge of it. And neither can animals.
27 Research on bird songs indicates that some birds live in a “faster” time than we do. This is why we need to
slow down recordings of bird songs to appreciate the structure of some of them — because what we experience
as a note (a single moment in time), they experience as an entire melody. Conversely, emerging research on
plant intelligence indicates that plants live in a “slower” time. We have to speed up their behavior via time-lapse
photography to understand it as purposeful and goal-directed (Lanza 2017; Pollan 2013).
26
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This is not to say that anyone who rejects the animal suicide hypothesis is necessarily
an anthropodenialist, especially given that this hypothesis ultimately claims less than many
critics assumed. Put bluntly, my argument was never that animals commit human suicides.
Fido is not going to steal the gun, point it at his head, and pull the trigger with its paw. My
argument was that we should exercise “epistemic humility” when faced with reports of
animal suicide because we have reliable empirical evidence that some animals do engage in
self-destructive and suicidal behaviors and good conceptual reasons to reject
anthropocentric definitions of suicide.
Either way, even the staunchest of skeptics has to at some point decide what to say
about mounting evidence that elbows us in the direction of animal suicide. Consider the
following two reports of animal suicide cited by Eilam and Benvenuti, respectively. The first
involves a monkey: the second, a bear.
“London, July 14, 1932. Sightseers at the Upton Zoo, Chester, witnessed an apparently
deliberate suicide by a monkey. The monkey first gnawed through a six-feet rope hanging
in his cage, tied one end to the bough of a tree, made a noose with the other end, inserted
his head with great deliberation, pulled the slipknot tight, climbed the tree and jumped.
Death was instantaneous. The keeper said that in a lifetime's experience he had not
known an animal deliberately commit suicide…. The reason of the suicide is unknown.
Had he domestic difficulties, or was he tired of life? Shocked spectators, expecting
amusement, witnessed the tragedy” (Eilam, p. 2).

And,
“King (2013, 2016) relates a heart-breaking anecdote about a mother bear and her cub
at the end of their lives on a bear farm in China. These farmed bears are kept horizontal
in coffin-like cages for their entire lives, with a metal catheter inserted into their
abdomens to harvest bile. They are allowed one unrestrained arm with which to feed
themselves. It is a life so horrible that reports say the bears sometimes simply go mad
and beat their heads against the bars of their cages until they die. On one mother bear,
King (2013) reports: ‘The cub cried out in distress as a worker prepared to harvest his
bile. The mother, distressed by her loved infant’s pain, broke free and squeezed the life
out of her baby so that he would no longer suffer. Overcome by her own emotional pain,
she ran, purposefully, headfirst into a wall, killing herself” (Benvenuti, p. 2).

Of course, skeptics can ignore these reports completely or characterize the behaviors they
describe as unconnected and random motoric outputs that magically give off the impression
of unity. Or, if they want to save time, they can point-blank dismiss them as “mere anecdotes.”
Soper & Shackelford opt for this path of least resistance when they assert that there
is no evidence of suicidal behavior “notwithstanding countless opportunities for such self
killings … to be documented by the world’s farmers, animal breeders, naturalists and
scientists.” But the issue is not that these reports don't exist, because they do (Ramsden &
Wilson 2014; Bekoff 2012; Palmer 2011; O’Hanlon 2010). The real issue is that scientists
systematically dismiss them as “anecdotes” and neutralize them under the pretense of
scientific rigor. One, of course, cannot but wonder what a report by a farmer or a breeder
would have to sound like for it not to be rejected as un-scientific and anecdotal, or what a
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report by a naturalist or a scientist would have to look like for it not to be mocked as
anthropomorphic. Perhaps something like this?
“At 0800 I found 14 lions of the Magadi pride at the edge of a marshy area about 20 m
from a bull buffalo standing up to his belly in mud and water. Deep lacerations cover his
muzzle and rump, his hocks are shredded, and his shoulders are full of bites, all the result
of an earlier attack this morning. He faces the lions and grunts each time one moves. One
lioness approaches to within 5 m of him but retreats when her paws get wet. At 0925
hours five nomadic males chase the pride away, then return to the buffalo at 1010 and
lie 6 to 10 m from him. Fifteen minutes later he walks slowly toward the lions, a suicidal
gesture. One male grabs his rump, another places a paw over his back and bites his
shoulder. The buffalo sinks to his knees. A lion then clambers up on the lower back of the
animal, bites him there and leans to one side as if attempting to turn him over.
Meanwhile the other lion first licks blood off the old wounds on his shoulder, then bites
there again. The buffalo bellows, yet makes no attempt to defend himself. The two males
then pull him on his side, slowly, methodically without violent movements. One grabs a
foreleg and turns him fully on his back. At this moment the third and fourth males join:
one bites the buffalo in the throat, the other holds his nose and mouth shut with his teeth.
The fifth male does nothing. One male eats the bull’s testicles. After 10 minutes, at 1040,
the buffalo dies” (Schaller 2009, p. 261).28

This gory account by the renowned conservationist George Schaller makes me wonder
whether suicidal behaviors go under-reported in the scientific community because observers
fear being labeled “anthropomorphic” by peers and colleagues — a label that, among
scientists, is basically a pejorative. Maybe Schaller, an expert on a research mission, lost his
mind under the blistering Tanzania sun. Or maybe he saw what he says he saw: a buffalo’s
suicidal gesture in a moment of crisis. How we respond to Schaller’s testimony, at any rate,
will always say more about us than him — or the buffalo, for that matter.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to all the commentators for their insightful comments and to the editorial team
of Animal Sentience for all their support.
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